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FOREWORD
The Crisis without a Face: Emerging
Narratives of the Financial Crisis
ADAM J. LEVITIN*
We are now in the second year of a global financial crisis unparal-
leled in recent memory. The crisis still lacks a universally accepted
name, 1 and is still far from over, even if we might be hopeful that the
most acute phase is behind us. Yet it is already apparent that the finan-
cial crisis will occupy a major place in scholarly and policy discussions
about the economy, financial institutions, consumer credit, and regula-
tion and the role of government in general for years to come.
Three major questions will emerge from this crisis. The first is
what went wrong (or put slightly differently, who is to blame). The
second will be an evaluation of the government and market's handling
of the crisis. And the third will be what the crisis has wrought.
Already, attempts are being made to answer these questions.
Scholarly evaluations of crisis management in general have emerged,2
and the reports of the Congressional Oversight Panel have provided a
critical policy analysis of federal responses to the crisis.' The crisis has
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to William
Bratton, Anna Gelpem, and Saule Omarova for comments and Michael R. Shaheen for research
assistance.
1. Brian Stelter, No Question We're in a Financial Pickle. What Do We Call It?, N.Y.
TiMEs, Dec. 12, 2008, at B8; Catherine Rampell, "Great Recession": A Brief Etymology, N.Y.
TiMEs, Mar. 11, 2009, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/l1/great-recession-a-brief-
etymology/?scp=4&sq=%22great%20recession%22&st=cse.
2. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Big Deal: The Government's Response to
the Financial Crisis (Jan. 29, 2008), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1306342.
3. The author served as Special Counsel for Mortgage Affairs for the Congressional
Oversight Panel. The Panel was created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act section
125, and is charged with providing Congress with monthly reports on the use of Troubled Asset
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also engendered thinking about how government should respond to cri-
ses in general.4 For the ultimate question of the impact of the crisis, it is
still too early to answer with anything more than speculation. How or
when this crisis will be resolved and what the state of financial institu-
tions, regulatory structures, and civic culture will be as a result remains
unknown
Although the crisis is itself still not over, yet attempts are already
being made to autopsy the economy.5 The question of what went wrong
is a topic that will occupy scholars and pundits for decades to come.
Already, though, some basic narratives have emerged: poor monetary
policy,6 deregulation,' bad regulation,8 innovation run amok,9 and greed.
Relief Program funds and efforts to address the foreclosure crisis, as well as a regulatory reform
report. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, ASSESSING TREASURY'S STRATEGY: SIX MONTHS OF TARP
(Apr. 7, 2009), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-040709-report.pdf; CONG.
OVERSIGHT PANEL, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM (Jan. 9, 2009),
available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-010909-report.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2009); Eric Posner & Adrian Vermuele, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and
the Financial Meltdown of 2008 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 442; Univ.
of Chi., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 248; Harv. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 08-50), available
at http://ssrn.comabstract=1301164; Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy or
Bailouts? (Univ. of Penn. Inst. for Law & Econ. Res. Paper No. 09-11; Nw. Law & Econ. Res.
Paper No. 09-05), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1362639; Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic
Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 213-34 (2008).
5. E.g., RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008
(2009); ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: How TODAY'S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2008); MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: A 3600 LOOK
AT THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE IMPLOSION, AND HOW TO AVOID THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS
(2008); PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 (2008)
6. E.g., id; John B. Taylor, How Government Created the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 9, 2009, at A19; see also Symposium: Did the Fed Cause the Housing Bubble,? WALL. ST.
J., Mar. 26, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123811225716453243.html; but see Jeffrey
Rogers Hummel & David R. Henderson, Did Greenspan Cause The Housing Bubble?,
FORBES.COM, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/17/greenspan-housing-bubble-
opinions-contributors-fed.html (arguing monetary policy did not cause the crisis).
7. E.g., Robert Kuttner, The Bubble Economy, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 24, 2007, at 20; Patricia
A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Systemic Risk through Securitization: The
Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 499-500, 514-17 (2009)
(noting Congressional deregulation of the mortgage market in the 1980s and deregulation by
preemption by federal regulatory agencies); but see David Leonhardt, Washington's Invisible
Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at MM32 (noting problems with blaming the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act for the financial crisis).
8. E.g., Peter J. Wallison, Cause and Effect: Government Policies and the Financial Crisis,
FIN. SERV'S. OUTLOOK (Amer. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol'y. Res., Washington, D.C.), Nov. 2008,
http://www.aei.org/publication29015; Peter J. Wallison, The True Origins of This Financial
Crisis, AEI ON THE ISSUES (Amer. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol'y. Res., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 19,
2009, www.aei.org/publication29419; Another 'Deregulation' Myth, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 18, 2008,
at A]2.
9. E.g., Anna Gelpem & Adam Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: The Workout
Prohibition in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
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These narratives are by no means exclusive explanations of the crisis;
they are often complementary.
This foreword briefly reviews the emerging narratives of the finan-
cial crisis, situates the articles in this issue in the context of the emerging
narratives, and concludes with some thoughts about the difficulties in
narrating the financial crisis.
A. The Narratives of the Financial Crisis
1. EASY MONEY LOOKING FOR TROUBLE
The first narrative of the crisis is a story of easy money seeking out
trouble.' ° As the story goes the Federal Reserve's monetary policy of
low interest rates and a surplus of investment funds from overseas (par-
ticularly Asia) encouraged greater borrowing. Low interest rates caused
investors looking for high rates of return moved to riskier investments.
Retail investors jumped into direct real estate investment, purchasing
homes as investments, and institutional investors galloped into subprime
mortgage-backed securities and other structured products.
There was, no doubt a flood of easy money in the period following
the bursting of the Internet bubble in 2000 due in part to the Federal
Reserve keeping interest rates low. But the easy money narrative is
clearly incomplete. It does not explain why the crisis took the form it
did." It does not tell us why it was a mortgage bubble, rather than
another investment bubble that formed. It does not tell us why the mort-
gage bubble formed in the United States (and to a lesser degree the UK,
Ireland, and Spain). And it does not tell us why a mortgage bubble in
the United States precipitated the worldwide financial crisis, whereas the
Internet bubble of the late 1990s only caused a minor recession and did
10. See JOHN TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: How GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND
INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009) (arguing the
fed's low-interest rate policy was the primary cause of the crisis); cf. Alan Greenspan, The Fed
Didn't Cause the Housing Bubble, WALL ST. J., Mar. I1, 2009, at A 15 (arguing global imbalances
depressing long-term rates was the primary cause); see also Posting of Tyler Cowen to Marginal
Revolution, Did the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Cause the Housing Bubble?, http://www.marginal
revolution.com/marginalrevolution/2008/09/did-the-gramm-l.html (Sept. 19, 2008, 06:48 EST)
(arguing GLBA played no role in bubble and ensuing crisis).
11. The expectation before 2007 was that there would be a United States currency crisis
caused by the unwinding of global imbalances, brought on by China moving to reduce its position
in U.S. Treasury securities. See, e.g., Brad Setser & Nouriel Roubini, How Scary is the Deficit?
Our Money, Our Debt, Our Problem, 84 FOREIGN AFFAIRS July/Aug. 2005 at 194 (2005); Paul
Krugman, Will There be a Dollar Crisis?, 22 ECON. POL'Y 435, 438-447 (2007); Nouriel Roubini
& Brad Setser, Will the Bretton Woods 2 Regime Unravel Soon? The Risk of a Hard Landing in
2005-2006, presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and University of California
at Berkeley Symposium, "Revived Bretton Woods System: A New Paradigm for Asian
Development?," (Feb. 4, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.frbsf.org/
economics/conferences/0502/Roubini.pdf).
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not lead to major financial institution failure. The easy money narrative
is certainly part of the story, but it cannot stand alone.
2. REGULATORY NARRATIVES
There are two narratives that place regulation at the center of the
story. One is a deregulatory narrative. As it goes, there was a con-
scious, ideologically-driven policy of deregulation-the removal safe-
guards that ensured financial institution safety-and-soundness and
consumer protection. Commonly cited examples are the erosion of the
separation between commercial banking and commerce (including spec-
ulative investment), which was the cornerstone of post-Depression bank
regulation, and federal banking agencies' preemption of state consumer
protection laws without substitution of equivalent federal protections.
The other regulatory narrative is one of the problems created by
poorly designed regulation, rather than the removal or lack of regulation.
It points to specific, arguably ill-conceived regulations enacted as part of
a conscious, ideological-driven agenda to regulate away "free market"
choice or to leverage self-regulation.12 The most common version of
this argument focuses on the Community Reinvestment Act, which,
some claim forced financial institutions to make risky loans.13
The deregulatory and bad regulatory narratives can be complemen-
tary-an emphasis on industry self-regulation or private regulation is a
form of deregulation. Alternatively, these narratives are complementary
because poor statutory regulatory architecture can lead to agency capture
and agency-driven deregulation at the behest of regulatees. 14
3. FRANKENSTEIN INNOVATION
Innovation run amok takes a Tory view of the crisis. It sees the
crisis as driven by innovations in financial products that the market and
regulators did not understand: subprime and exotic mortgage products,
securitization, credit default swaps and other derivatives. In this view,
innovation outran both the market and regulation. Evaluations of finan-
cial products' risk are largely based on the products' historical perform-
ance of financial products. Because these products were relatively new
and untested, they entailed a host of poorly understood risks. As a
12. The use of quotation marks around "free market" is to emphasize that the free market is a
Platonic ideal; there is no market that is not shaped by regulation, either directly or indirectly.
Government involvement in one market affects investment tradeoffs between markets. The very
existence of government, which requires some sort of regulation and taxation to fund itself, means
that markets exist along a continuum of levels of government involvement, rather than on a binary
free/regulated divide.
13. See, e.g., Wallison, supra note 8.
14. See Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, ALArrmc, May 2009.
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result, market exposures to these products were larger than they should
have been and there was no regulatory framework to protect the market.
4. GREED
The greed narrative is more generalized. It implies, however, that
some or all parties involved in the financial crisis understood the risks
involved in their transactions, but didn't care because they were blinded
by greed. Thus, everyone involved in the underwriting of risky financial
products (including mortgages) was willing to arrange deals selling risky
products because they had fee-based business models, and the credit risk
was sold to someone else. (Of course, often it was sold to these under-
writers investment affiliates.) Investors were so thirsty for yield that
they overlooked what in hindsight were glaringly obvious risks in their
investments. And homeowners greedy for larger McMansions (or eager
to keep up with their neighbors) bought larger houses than they could
afford based on teaser interest rates without regard for the long-term
consequences.
Greed, of course, is an element of the other narratives: with low
interest rates, greed sent institutional investment funds racing for high
yield investments like subprime mortgage-backed securities and sent
consumers flooding into the housing marketplace. And greed fueled
deregulation, as regulation places constraints on what might be other-
wise more profitable (even if societally less desirable) business prac-
tices. Likewise, greed fueled innovation, as financial engineers sought
to create ever more profitable products.
The narratives of the crisis exist in both a scholarly and a political
realm, and legal academia is a field that sits uncomfortably on the divide
between pure scholarship and policy advocacy. For example, a version
of the deregulatory theme is championed by those who wish to see
greater regulation as a policy matter (generally Democrats), whereas a
version of the bad regulatory trope is trumpeted by those who wish to
see deregulation (generally Republicans).
The greed meme has different politics; it is neither Left nor Right
per se. Instead, is used to blame those who profited in the run-up to the
crisis (but of course not everyone greedy profited), especially financial
institution executives, speculators, be they house-flippers or investors, 5
or people who bought more house than they could afford, hoping the
market would continue going up. The implication of this narrative is
15. On speculators, see generally Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation
and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DuKE L.J. 701 (1999); Thomas Lee
Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securities Regulation, Derivatives
Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REv. BANKiNG & FIN. LAW 434 (2005).
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that these individuals do not merit assistance from the federal govern-
ment, but should be left to face the consequences of their decisions.
When deployed against Wall Street, this is often an argument of the
Left; when deployed against homeowners, it is usually an argument of
the Right.
Alternatively, the greed narrative is used to cast such generalized
blame as to make the blame meaninglessly banal. Greed is human
nature, after all, so what were we to expect? This line of pseudo-Calvin-
ist argument nearly removes human agency from the crisis.
B. The Narratives in the Articles in this Volume
The articles in this volume each contribute to the burgeoning litera-
ture on the crisis and advance our understanding of the crisis by elabo-
rating on different narrative threads. Saule T. Omarova's article, The
Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivates Changed the "Business of Bank-
ing,"16 will be viewed as a classic case study on the process of deregula-
tion. To date, arguments about deregulation have focused on legislative
enactments, like the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,' 7 the Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,18 the Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (including the Alternative
Mortgage Transaction Parity Act),' 9 or on judicial decisions, like the
Supreme Court's notorious ruling in Marquette National Bank2° that had
the effect of eviscerating state usury laws,"1 the primary method of con-
sumer credit regulation. More recent scholarship has come to recognize
that a great deal of deregulation occurred through quiet, unglamorous
actions by regulatory agencies, through self-arrogation of preemption
authority.22 In a compelling and nuanced article, Professor Omarova
demonstrates another path to deregulation, as she shows how the opinion
letters of the Office of Comptroller of the Currency incrementally and
16. 63 U. MiAMi L. REv. 1041 (2009).
17. Kuttner, supra note 7.
18. See generally, McCoy et al., supra note 7; John Atlas & Peter Dreier, The Conservative
Origins of the Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis, Am. PROSPECr, Dec. 18, 2007, http://www.prospect.
org/cs/articles?article=theconservative origins-ofthe-subprimemortgagecrisis.
19. See generally McCoy et al., supra note 7; Paul Krugman, Reagan Did It, N.Y. TMES,
June 1, 2009, at A21.
20. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minn. v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
21. Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE
J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2009); Thomas Geoghegan, Infinite Debt: How Unlimited Interest Rates
Destroyed the Economy, HARPER'S, Apr. 2009, at 31; Howell E. Jackson & Stacy A. Anderson,
Can States Tax National Banks to Educate Consumers About Predatory Lending Practices?, 30
HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 831, 836 (2007).
22. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority
and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN.
REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 288-93 (2004); Levitin, supra note 21; McCoy et al., supra note 7.
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discretely undermined the antiquated statutory framework for the regula-
tion of national banks and permitted national banks to expose them-
selves to speculative risks that are fundamentally inconsistent with the
safety and stability needed in depositary institutions.
Omarova's article is an illustration of the banality of deregulation;
it need not be through explicit, bold moves, but can also occur piecemeal
in the shadows. Indeed, this surreptitious deregulation through opinion
letters that were unlikely to attract the attention of anyone but national
banks themselves, is particularly insidious because it was never sub-
jected to a critical policy debate. Even if the Comptroller was correct in
permitting national banks to engage in ever-expanding derivatives activ-
ities, the expansion of bank activities is troubling because it has occurred
in a regulatory framework that is premised on banks not engaging in
speculative activities. To quietly change one piece of the regulatory
framework risks rendering other parts of the regulatory framework inef-
fective or even counterproductive.
The Comptroller, of course, did not set out in the early 1980s on
with the intent of arriving at the current state of regulation; instead, the
regulatory changes occurred one small step at a time, and perhaps with-
out a full sense of the transformation that was occurring. But the will-
ingness of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to keep pushing
the envelope with opinion letters authorizing ever greater bank derivate
activities and its practice of not publishing opinion letters denying bank
requests for authorization speak to the regulatory capture of the OCC
and to the larger issue capture in financial services regulation.
While Professor Omarova's article is primarily part of a deregu-
latory narrative, it also has strong highlight of other narrative strands.
The OCC's opinion letters have enabled unchecked innovation for
national banks, and banks' entry into the derivatives market is a type of
Frankenstein innovation from a regulatory perspective as Professor
Omarova notes, bank regulators do not understand the risk exposures
from complicated derivatives transactions.23 As a result, they have had
to refer to internal risk-models at banks.
The outsourcing of regulatory control is a problem featured in Kia
Dennis's article, The Ratings Game: Explaining Rating Agency Failures
in the Build Up to the Financial Crisis.24 Professor Dennis's article
speaks to another line of explanatory narrative-bad regulation. The
bad regulation line of narrative is most frequently showcased in thor-
oughly debunked claim that the financial crisis was spurred by subprime
loans made to risky borrowers by financial institutions seeking to com-
23. Omarova, supra note 16, at 1107.
24. 63 U. MIAEn L. REV. 1111 (2009).
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ply with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).25
Professor Dennis's article features a more compelling version of
the bad regulation narrative than the politically-charged attack on the
CRA. Professor Dennis shows how securities regulations that attempted
to leverage private ratings agencies' ratings into regulatory benchmarks
ultimately backfired. The ratings agencies were incorporated into the
regulatory structure as private gatekeepers without a fully understanding
of their incentives, which contributed to their failure as gatekeepers.
Professor Dennis's article can also be understood as telling a der-
egulatory tale. The shift from public regulation to private ordering is
deregulatory, even if it occurs as part of an explicit regulatory frame-
work. And, like Professor Omarova's article, it emphasizes the dangers
inherent in government using private actors as agents. Governmental
attempts to leverage private actors as regulatory agents face the same
agency risk problems as any private market use of agents.
Frankenstein innovation makes an appearance as well in The Rat-
ings Game; the failures of the ratings agencies were not with their tradi-
tional ratings of corporate bonds, but with their ratings of new structured
financial products, like subprime mortgage-backed securities and collat-
eralized debt obligations. On some level, the ratings agencies might not
have fully understood the risks inherent in these products. On the other
hand, they might have understood the risks, but intentionally down-
played them in order to give the products higher ratings and ensure
repeat business. Thus, the greed narrative also figures prominently in
Professor Dennis's article-she argues that the failure of the ratings
agencies as gatekeepers was due to an imbalanced incentive structure
that rewards overly optimistic ratings. Once this incentive structure was
in place, self-interest and greed took over with disastrous results.26
Mitchell Crusto's article, Obama's Moral Capitalism,27 also taps
into the greed narrative. Professor Crusto takes the insights of critical
legal studies and applies them to the examples of institutional rapacious-
ness exhibited in the build-up to the financial crisis. He argues that the
response to greed should be a constitutional one-namely that there
should be a constitutional protection against predatory lending. Profes-
25. See, e.g., Wallison, supra note 8. For a debunking of the view that the CRA had any
connection to the financial crisis, see CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING
TOWARD A SOLUTION, at 83-84 (Mar. 6th, 2009), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/
cop-030609-report.pdf; see also Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The Genesis of the Current
Economic Crisis: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 111 th
Cong. 25-27 (2008) (statement of Eric Stein, Senior Vice President, Center for Responsible
Lending).
26. Dennis, supra note 24, at 1129.
27. 63 U. MtAMr L. REV. 1011 (2009).
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sor Crusto's constitutional move is unique among responses to the crisis.
Rather than understanding the crisis as one of specific regulatory or mar-
ket failures, he understands it as having a rights dimension. Specifically,
Professor Crusto sees predatory lending as affecting a fundamental (if
yet unacknowledged) right against economic exploitation. Regulation
and markets exist against a backdrop of constitutional rights, and Profes-
sor Crusto aims to expand that constitutional framework.
The avocation of any new constitutional rights is an uphill battle,
but Professor Crusto's proposal for constitutional changes evinces a
desire to see not just regulatory changes, but a shift in cultural mores
about market capitalism. The constitution, after all, is a social compact
that merely enshrines rights reflecting widely held social norms. To be
sure, Professor Crusto is not calling for a generic right against economic
exploitation. A generalized right would be nothing more than utopian:
virtually everyone is at some point an economic exploiter and exploitee.
Instead, Professor Crusto sees predatory lending as a problem when the
predation is focused on particularly vulnerable classes of citizens.
Whether or not one agrees with Professor Crusto's call for a consti-
tutional right against predatory lending, the thoughts and discussions
that his proposal will provoke are meritorious in and of themselves. His
call for a constitutional right puts square and center issues of distributive
justice and power dynamics within society. These are issues are fre-
quently ignored by those with power because it is difficult to acknowl-
edge distributive issues without acceding to changes in status quo
distribution. Yet in the post-capitalist, regulated economy, all choices
are distributional, and to ignore distributional questions is itself to make
a distributional choice. The very existence of government and regula-
tion makes distributional questions part of any policy debate.
C. Making Sense of the Narratives
What is one to make of these different narrative strands of the
financial crisis? How is one to choose among them or how are they to
be integrated? This task is beyond the scope of this foreword, other than
to suggest that the crisis was very much a product of a combination of
factors and to try to foist a single-factor narrative on a multi-causal pro-
cess is intellectually untenable. While this might do for punditry, it will
not do for more serious intellectual endeavors, and, to the credit of the
articles in this issue, they do not try to force the issue. There is explana-
tory power to all of these broad narratives; yet none of them can be
individually successful at explaining the entire financial crisis.
The competing and yet complementary narratives of the crisis also
underscore an essential difficulty for any scholar who wishes to write
2009]
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the story of the financial crisis: the lack of a clear protagonist or antago-
nist. There is no hero or villain that can guide a narrative.
To be sure, the is a cast of characters who emerge from time to time
as white knights, heavies, or ingrnues. There are would-be heroes like
CFTC Chair Brooksley Born, who attempted unsuccessfully to regulate
the derivatives market,28 and the late Federal Reserve Governor Edward
Gramlich, who attempted to rein in the mortgage bubble,2 9 as well as
FDIC Chair Sheila Bair, who championed efforts to address the foreclo-
sure crisis.30 The emerging narratives have would-be villains like Alan
Greenspan, Phil Gramm, and Henry Paulson, all of whom are portrayed
as, in varying degrees, as being ideologically driven fail to regulate, to
deregulate, or to trust the market except when necessary to protect cro-
nies. And then there are the hapless ingdnues characters of Ben
Bernanke, Neil Kashkari, and Timothy Geithner, who have appeared at
times to be overwhelmed by events. There are certainly institutional
players that can be cast in the role of the heavy: financial institutions
like AIG, Bear Steams, Citigroup, Countrywide, Goldman Sachs,
IndyMac, and Lehman Brothers, and regulators like the Federal Reserve,
the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision,
and Securities and Exchange Commission. And already the casting of
these figures is being revisited. On the one-year anniversary of Lehman
Brother's collapse, commentator Joe Noccra argued for a reappraisal of
the roles of Bernanke and Paulson, contending that "History, I now
believe, will praise their efforts in subduing the collapse."31
None of these characters can carry the drama themselves. For bet-
ter or worse, all of these individuals and institutions were no more than
bit players in a crisis that is marked by its maddening impersonality.
Just as the crisis remains nameless, so too is it faceless. There is no
Michael Milken or Charles Keating to be the face of the crisis. Bernard
Madoff has been the greatest villain to emerge from the crisis, but he is
no more than a footnote; he neither caused nor benefited from the crisis;
instead, it was his undoing. Madoff's was a Ponzi scheme distinguished
only by its size and longevity, not by its macroeconomic impact.
There is a certain appropriateness to the crisis's impersonality, as it
reflects another deeper theme in understanding the crisis: the decline of
28. See, e.g., Andrd Douglas Ponds Cummings, Still "Ain't No Glory in Pain": How the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Other 1990s Deregulation Facilitated the Market Crash of
2002, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 467, 529-38.
29. See, e.g., Greg Ip, James R. Hagerty, & Jonathan Karp, Housing Bust Fuels Blame Game,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2008, at Al.
30. See, e.g., Damian Paletta, FDIC's Bair Gets Nod to Stay, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2009, at A3.
31. Joe Noccra, Lehman Had to Die So Global Finance Could Live, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
2009, at Al.
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relational finance. Financial relationships were historically relational:
the creditor-debtor relationship had a face to it on both sides. Lending
institutions were local, and lenders retained credit risk, which bound
them to their debtors. This imposed constraints lending; creditors could
not afford to be too aggressive and too greedy because when loans went
bad, they were part of the impacted communities. Moreover, creditors
also understood that they were part of an economic ecosystem, and over-
exploitation of a locally limited borrower base in one period would
diminish the value of that borrower base in later periods. Finally, when
lending was local, individual lenders were dispensable; they were not so
interconnected with the entire national and global economy that they
were too big to fail, so they didn't suffer from the moral hazard of an
implied bailout.
The financial instruments at the core of the current crisis-securi-
tized mortgages and credit default swaps-are marked by their imper-
sonality. Whereas the residential mortgage is traditionally a relational
loan, securitization transforms it and strips it of all of its relational
aspects. The beneficial owner of the securitized mortgage neither knows
nor cares about the borrower, who might be on the other side of the
country or the globe; so too the servicer, who manages the loan and is
not looking for an on-going relationship with the borrower. Likewise,
credit default swaps, a form of credit insurance, evolved from being an
insurance policy taken out by a lender to an insurance policy taken out
by a party with no insurable interest-a gamble on the fortune of an
unrelated party's business.
The shift from personal to impersonal, from relational lending to
capital markets, from Main Street to Wall Street, from local to global
has meant that the crisis cannot be cabined off to one country or to one
sector of the economy. Mourning this transformation is a variation of
the Tory view of the crisis, but one need not mourn the loss of tradi-
tional lending to recognize that law needs to adjust to keep pace.
Financial product innovation, like most innovation, has a mixed
valence-it can create new benefits, like democratized credit, but also
new risks, and altered distributional effects. Unfortunately, one of the
great fallacies of the recent expansion in financial innovation was the
idea that innovation could dissipate risk, rather than simply redistribute
it. In then end, however, it appears that there is a certain quantum of
risk in finance that can never be removed, only amplified. Sales like
securitization and insurance devices like derivates cannot be guaranteed
to do more than merely shift risk. Loan sales shift risk to the purchaser
of the loan, while insurance on loans substitutes the credit risk of the
insurer for the credit risk of the borrower. When the parties selling and
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buying risk turn out to be the same ones or to be heavily interconnected
in their dealings, there is no escape from the credit risk of the underlying
loans. As it turned out, the very devices by which financial institutions
sought to dissipate risk-securitization and credit derivates-in fact
only redistributed and amplified it.
All three articles in this volume are attempting in one way or
another to deal with this situation. Professor Omarova's article high-
lights the need of regulators to maintain control over industries that are
no longer constrained by traditional relationships and assumptions.32
Professor Dennis' article likewise emphasizes the need for an effective
substitute for the constraints imposed by relational lending. Ratings
agencies developed for this very purpose, in the early part of the 20th
century, as corporate debt markets expanded to a national scale.
Whether they can operate as effectively for consumer lending remains to
be seen. 3 And Professor Crusto's article looks to change the normative
background on which the entire system operates in order to account for
the dangers the spring from impersonalized lending.34
What the financial crisis has wrought remains to be seen, but as the
articles in this volume attest, it is spurring a major and much-needed
rethinking about law, institutions, and society.
32. Omarova, supra note 16.
33. Dennis, supra note 24.
34. Crusto, supra note 27.
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